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CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Plaintiffs/Appellants initially move to correct certain errors in
the Defendants'/Appellees' Statement of the Case. In their brief
Defendants/Appellees assert:

1)

"Premier pre-authorized the surgery . . . " Brief, pages 3

and 8,

Defendants offer no reference to the record confirming

this because there is no documentation. Premier never authorized
the suraerv nor any part of it.

To make assertions without

citations to the Record violates Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

Also, in Uckerman v. Lincoln Natfl Life

Ins. Co,. 588 P2d. 142, (UT. 1978) the court said:
The Supreme Court need not, and will
not, consider any facts not properly
cited to, or supported by, the record.
At page 5, point 6, Defendants assert, ''Premier refused to
certify Plaintiffs' request for pre-certification of the hospital
charges . . . " Direct contradiction of this misrepresentation is
found in Appendix WA" to Plaintiffs' Opening Brief. This exhibit
is a letter from Premier to the Atkinsons wherein Premier says it
"was unable to pre-certify" the Atkinsons' request for benefits
because "it did not meet (Premier's) criteria for medical
necessity/appropriateness.» Record 6, point 12; and 36, point 12;
146, 191, point 4. (It is a document admissible under Rule 901
(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence*)

2)

That Mrs. Atkinson "attempts to have the court believe that

their contractual claim is for more than the hospital charges.
It is not." Brief @22 Plaintiffs have complained of a direct loss
in paying for the surgery in addition to claiming the costs and
reasonable attorney's fees associated with this lawsuit, for
severe emotional distress and for other special and general
damages.

Record @ 24-25. Under, Beck v. Farmers. (1985) 701 P2d.

795, 801-802, all these are recoverable contract damages.

3)

Defendants say they moved for summary judgment "after

Plaintiffs had conducted significant discovery.1* Defendants'
Brief, pages 4 and 8.

The only discovery accomplished was that

Plaintiffs served 2 sets of interrogatories and 2 requests for
production of document (on each Defendant) which produced 1560
documents.

Yet, Defendants first filed their motion for summary

judgment on 10/17/96 only 90 days after answering Plaintiffs'
complaint on 07/17/96. Record, 60 & 33. No depositions were set
before Defendants brought their motion and Judge Wilkerson
suspended further discovery during the pendency of the summary
judgment motion. Record @ 294, page 11, lines 5-7.

Plaintiffs

had no opportunity to depose anyone concerning any of the 1560
pages of documentation Defendants produced.

4)

*GEM paid benefits for the oral surgery, anesthesiologist,

anesthesia, and all other benefits related to the oral surgery .

. .* Brief, page 7, point 16 and pages 11, 22 & 23. GEM and/or
PREMIER never certified any part of the Plaintiffs' request for
benefits. Again, Defendants make no citation to the record
proving GEM certified any part of the Atkinson's request for
benefits. Thus, again they violate Rule 24(a)(9) of the U.R.A.P.

GEM paid certain charges connected with the surgery only after
they were on formal notice that Plaintiffs intended to sue them.
Recordf 194, 235. GEM paid the first claim 05/06/96 only 46 days
before Plaintiffs' filed their lawsuit and the policy requires
the Atkinson wait at least 60 days after notice to GEM of the
claim before filing suit.

Recordf 220, 1, 111, and 251. It is

clear that since Defendants never approved any part of the
Plaintiffs' request for benefits, they were not going to pay for
it.

And it was only by the threat of an incipient lawsuit that

GEM finally paid certain costs associated with the surgery.
Plaintiffs characterize such conduct as bad faith,

A R G U M E N T S :
PREMIER AS GEM'S AGENT:
Defendants a l l e g e , "Premier i s not an i n s u r e r a t a l l . Also
P l a i n t i f f s do not have a d i r e c t c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with
Premier."

Brief, page 6, p o i n t 7, P l a i n t i f f s have a l l e g e d and

Defendants have agreed Premier i s an agent of GEM.

Record, 85,
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143-145, and 188-192. Plaintiffs allege Premier is GEM's agent
when deciding whether to pre-certify or deny certification to a
GEMfs insured's request for benefits.

Likewise, Premier is GEM's

agent under the definitions promulgated by the Utah Insurance
Commissioner's Rules (R590-89-4 (A)(B) and (F)) and under the
Insurance Code's, "Claims Practices Act", U.C.A. 31A-26-3Q3(1).
Record, 143-145, 188-192,

Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of the GEM - Premier
contract. Record, 145-146; 188-192. As additional authority for
the Atkinson's right to sue Premier in bad faith because Premier
was 6EMfs agent and that the Atkinson's were third party beneficaries of the GEM - Premier contract, Plaintiffs cite, Barney v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 185 CA3d 972; 230 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219:
Where a contract confers on one party a discretionary
power affecting the rights of others, a duty is impose
to exercise that discretion in good faith and in
accordance with fair dealing, (citations omitted.)
Further, under Broadwater v. Old Republic, (UT, 1993) 854 P2d
527,536, third party beneficiaries are those persons:
Recognized as having enforceable rights created in them
by a contract to which they are not parties and for which
they give no consideration• (citations omitted.)
To have an enforceable rightf the contracting parties must
have clearly intended to confer a separate and distinct
benefit upon the third party* (citations omitted.)
See also arguments in
Record, @ 145-146; 188-191-

4

Plaintiffs have alleged GEM and Prezoier acted in bad faith, made
misrepresentations and conspired to defraud them of the benefits
of their contract. Record, 5-18 In Beck, our Supreme Court
recognized both an insurer's duty to act in good faith and that a
breach of this duty can result in tortuous causes of action.
Beck supra, @ 800, ftnt. 3

Plaintiffs herein are members of the class (GEM's insureds) for
whose benefit the GEM - PMN contract was expressly made and
consequently are expressed third party beneficiaries thereunder.

A third party may enforce contract expressly made
for his benefit and in appropriate cases his right
to enforce the contract extends to implied covenants.
Northwest Mut. Ins., v. Farmers Ins. Grp, 76 CA3d
1036; 143 Cal. Rptr., 415, 421-422. (CA 1978)

EMERGENCY SURGERY:
Counsel argues, "Mrs, Atkinson's treatment was not of an
emergency in nature in that the treatment took place approximately 10 months after diagnosis." Brief, page 12, Yet, on
12/15/95, Dr. Bull said:
. . . .She underwent two vessel coronary artery bypass
grafting at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center on November
6th, 1995. In follow-up she made a satisfactory recovery
following this procedure. She now requires oral surgery
for removal of multiple abscessed teeth. . . .
Record, @ 257

5

On 12/20/95, Dr. Castle said:
Sharon Mayes-Atkinson has symptomatic artery disease for
which on November 6, 1995, she had two vessel coronary
bypass graft surgery. At that time, she had abscesses in her
mandible for which she was treated with antibiotics. It has
been strongly recommended that she have this corrected as
soon as her cardiac condition and recovery have stabilized."
Record, @ 258.
On 12/20/95, Dr. Walker said:
The above named patient is scheduled to have a subtotal
odontectomy on December 29, 1995 at Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center. . . .
Record, @ 259.
And on 12/21/95, Dr. Evers said:
. . , . At this time she is stable . . .
Recordf @ 256

Basically, these records reflect Sharon Atkinson underwent heart
surgery on 11/06/95 and the problem of the abscessed teeth
required immediate medical intervention so soon as she stabilized
from the surgery. She was considered stable on 12/21/95 and
surgery was scheduled for 12/29/95, eight days later.

The delay

from 12/29/95 to 02/05/96 was solely caused by Defendants refusal
to approve the surgery. In the interim, Plaintiffs had to secure
the money for the surgery. So, in difference to Defendants'
counsel's opinion, the records reflect this was urgent surgery.

ABSCESSED TEETH vs. POISONED BLOOD:
Defendant's counsel argues the condition underlying
Mrs. Atkinson's surgery was "abscessed teeth" in difference to

6

"poisoned blood," Brief, @ 10 & 18. The distinction is medically
without merit. It is not contested that her four treating doctors
agreed that her abscessed teeth required extraction. Why? Because
they were "abscessed," "Abscess" means, a localized collection of
pus formed by tissue disintegration and surrounded by an inflamed

area, American Heritage

Dictionary,

New College

Edition.

Mrs. Atkinson needed the teeth removed to stop further infection,
i-e,, to stop further disintegration of the tissue surrounding
her teeth. The infection, the pus was entering her bloodstream
and this needed to be stopped. Thus, the underlying condition
addressed by extracting the teeth was the pus generated by the
tissue disintegration. This was a medical problem and should have
been covered under the medical provisions of her policy.

Assuming arguendo, this was not a "medical1' problem but rather a
dental one, in moving to stop the infection, the surgery was a
"preventive" procedure.

And under the GEM's Outline of Coverage,

the dental benefit for "preventive" dental care is paid at 100%,
A hundred percent would include all hospital charges.
directly contradicts the exclusion.

This

Record, @ 113, point 5,

Optional Coverage.

GENERAL vs. LOCAL ANESTHESIA;
In their Brief Plaintiffs assert that several provisions of the
dental policy are inconsistent with the exclusion.

One such

7

provision provided that, "General anesthesia is a benefit only
when used in conjunction with oral surgery."

Brief, @ 13-15

Record, @ 254, point 3. That is, it is a benefit only when used
in a hospital setting and "general anesthesia and oral surgery
must be provided by different providers," Understandably, the
Atkinsons could reasonably believe that because the general
anesthesia was covered, so were the hospital charges. Defendants
now argue that this is not inconsistent with the exclusion
because teeth extractions, even with anesthesia, are usually done
in a dentist's office. Defendants' Brief, @ 19, Defendants,
however, fail to distinguish between *local* and "general"
anesthesia.

General anesthesia is usually done in a hospital

setting by an anesthesiologist while a local anesthesia can be
administered in a dental office by a dentist. Moreover, the
Defendants' argument violates the policy requirement that the
care ube provided by different providers", i,e., the dentist
can't provide the anesthesia.

Finally, local anesthesia is not a

covered benefit. See, Record Point 7, pages 109 & 254.

It is widely understood that general anesthesia is a delicate
medical procedure that can cause many serious complications
including death. Defendants' argument ignores both this and
Dr. Walker's position:
. . . . Due to the extensive nature of her oral
surgery and her co-existent cardiac disease, she
will require monitoring under the care of an
anesthesiologist during her oral surgery.
Record, @ 257.
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Another important point is that while the policy requires a
licensed dentist, Mrs. Atkinson's surgery was performed by
Dr. Walker a dentist, a medical doctor, a surgeon and a Diplomat
of the American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. Record,
253 point 4, 257. Clearly, the anesthesia required here was not a
novocain injection and this surgery was not simply "pulling a
tooth."

DEFENDANTS' OFF-POINT ARGUMENTS:
1)

Defendants miss the point when they argue that that an

insurer could exclude coverage for cancer or that this policy
excludes treatment for injuries sustained during the commission
of a felony. They attempt to use these loose examples as
analogies to the present exclusion. Brieff page 16. But they miss
the point in assuming that the cancer and felony exclusions are
unambiguous.

If, like the exclusion in contest, these exclusions

are ambiguous then they would not be enforceable.
Instantly, the pivotal issue surrounds the question of whether
the exclusion is ambiguous, not whether an insurer has a right to
draft exclusions into an insurance policy.

2)

Plaintiffs cited legal authority that reflects that

insurance policy provisions must be construed from the
perspective an average, reasonable purchaser of insurance.
Plaintiffs' Brief, @ 23. Defendants have not disputed this.
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Defendants' Brief, 13,14, & 17. But, Defendants then go on to
argue the interpretation should be from a legal or judicial
perspective.

On page 18 of their brief, Defendants admit to

ambiguity between provisions of the policy.

Continuing, they

argue that the court should enforce the specific provisions of
the exclusion (which exclude all hospital changes incurred xvin
conjunction with dentistry') over the general provisions which
(Defendants admit) would pay such costs as hospital room and
board charges.

Again, Defendants miss the point.

The question is: Is the

exclusion ambiguous to the average, reasonable purchaser of
insurance? The average, reasonable purchaser of insurance would
surely be confused by Defendants argument requiring a court to
prefer an interpretation of a specific exclusion over a general
provision providing coverage. The ambiguity question is
determined from the perspective of the average, reason-able,
purchaser of insurance not from a court's perspective. At least,
Defendants' argument does admit to the ambiguity. Accordingly,
the exclusion cannot be enforced.

3)

Another example wherein Defendants miss the point in contest
is when they assert that:
Utah has expressly rejected the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, holding that the reasonable expectations
of an insured may not be used to enforce a contract
when those expectations conflict with the plain terms
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of the policy. . . . Therefore, Plaintiffs have no
claim based on the reasonable expectations doctrine.
Brief, @ 21-21.

The point ignored/missed is that the Atkinsons' "reasonable
expectations" are not in "conflict with the plain terms of the
policy."

The Atkinson's reasonable expectations do not conflict

with any "plain terms* of the exclusion. The Atkinsons believe
the exclusion is not plain, but rather ambiguous both in itself
and when read in references to other provisions of the policy.
The exclusion's ambiguities conflict with their "reasonable
expectations."

So, while Defendants' case law citations may be

correct statements of the law, the factual application they
attempt to plug into this law is fatally defective.

ISSUES OTHER THAN COVERAGE ISSUES:
In a footnote on page 4 of their Brief, Defendants argue that
because: 1) Defendants moved for summary judgment on all the
issues and because 2) Judge Wilkinson granted summary judgment on
all the issues and because 3) Appellants' did not address the
other issues in their opening brief but addressed only the
coverage question, summary judgment on the other causes of action
must stand.
Reference to the record however, proves otherwise.

Plaintiffs'

brief addressed only the exclusion issue because Judge Wilkinson

mandated this approach. He granted summary judgement on all the
issues when he found the exclusion was not ambiguous. Record @
293; page 12, line 20 to page 13, line 7.
Commonsense dictates that:
If Judge Wilkinson voided Plaintiffs' entire Complaint
because he found the exclusionary clause was not ambiguous,
then if Plaintiffs prevail in this appeal, all their
causes of action should be brought back from limbo.

At the 04/18/97 hearing, Judge Wilkinson heard oral arguments
from Mr. Fife. Initially, Mr. Fife asked the court if he should
address the other, vclaims against GEMf first", but the Court
said no and directed him to speak only to the coverage question.
Record, 293; page 4, lines 18-24.

Later, after arguing the

coverage question, Mr. Fife asked the Court if he should address
any other questions. The Court replied, *No, I wanted to hear
just that",

Recordf @ 293; page 7, lines 6-8.

Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Fay, then argued the coverage question.
Record, @ 293; pages 7-11.

After finishing his coverage question

arguments, Mr. Fay inquired, "Is there any other issue the court
would like me to address?"

The court said, "No." Record, @ 293;

page 11, lines 6-8.

Mr. Fife then commenced his rebuttal argument addressed solely to
the coverage dispute.

Record, @ 293; page 11. When Mr. Fay
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asked the court if he could respond, the court said, No. Recordf
@ 293; page 12, lines 13-15.

Immediately thereafter, the court

threw-out Plaintiffs' entire Complaint because it found the
exclusion was not ambiguous. Record, 293, page 12:20 to 13:7,

At the hearing, on four different occasions the Court refused to
permit arguments addressed to other issues.

Thus, the record

from the hearing is silent on all references to other causes of
action upon which Plaintiffs could mount arguments in their favor
to cause reversal of the court's summary judgment.

Plaintiffs addressed all the information that was available from
the court hearing in their Opening Brief. And, while earlier they
made written arguments addressed to these other claims, there is
no reference how the court ruled on these arguments save exactly
what Plaintiffs have addressed.

One of the California Maxims of Jurisprudence is:

WHEN THE REASON IS THE SAME
THE RULE SHOULD BE THE SAME.
Cal* Civil Code: 3511

Here the reason the Court voided the Plaintiff's entire Complaint
was because of its' finding on the coverage question. Accord-

ingly, if the Court was wrong on the coverage question, all the
claims should be reinstated, because that was the only known
ground upon which they were voided.

In State v. Irwin. 924 P2d 5, (UT Ct. App., 1996) the court said:
AN APPELLATE COURT MAY ADDRESS AN ISSUE RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IF APPELLANT ESTABLISHES
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR, IF THERE
ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, • . .
The Irwin court continued:
The exceptional circumstances concept serves to
assure that manifest injustice does not result
from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.

Plaintiffs offer that when the trial court closed-off all
arguments on all the other issues, it committed plain error and
for this Tribunal to refuse to consider all those other issues
would result in manifest injustice to Plaintiffs.

SURVIVING ISSUE:
Plaintiffs assert that notwithstanding everything else, one issue
still survived summary judgment, i.e., the reasons underlying
Premier's refusal to pre-certify Plaintiffs' request for
benefits.

Repeatedly, Premier has asserted it pre-authorized the surgery,
but refused to pre-authorize the hospital charges because of the

exclusion, " (Record, @ 70 & 164, point 6, and Plaintiffs' Brief
pages 34-36) Plaintiffs claim this is false.

Plaintiffs assert

Premier denied Atkinson's request for benefits because the
request, M i d not meet (Premier's) criteria for medical necessity
or appropriateness."

See, Record, 6, point 12; 36 point 12; 146,

191 @ point 4, and Appendix *A* to Appellants' Opening Brief.

In their brief, Defendants argue that:
Defendants delineated the undisputed, material facts . . .
including the reason for Premier's refusal to pre-certifv
Mrs. Atkinson's hospital expenses . . . These factual
issues were addressed in the affidavits of Sara Meadowcroft who had personal knowledge of the facts."
Defendants' Brief @ 12.

And further, Appellants should have filed an affidavit to counter
Meadowcroft's allegations. Because they did not, their claim must
fail. Defendants' Brief @ 12.
This is plain error. Plaintiffs direct the Court to Meadowcroft's affidavits.

Recordf @ 62-66 and 219-221. Meadowcroft's

affidavits are not nearly so broad as Defendants would like this
Court to believe.

In her affidavits, Meadowcroft swears:

•

She works for GEM# examined GEM#s file and has
personal knowledge of the GEM file.

•

GEM refused to pay for the claim for hospital
charges relying on the dental exclusion.
Record @ 62-63

In her second affidavit she states:
She works for GEM, reviewed GEM'S file and has
personal knowledge of the GEM file.
Pursuant to the terms of Ms. Atkinson's health and
dental insurance policies, GEM refused to pay for the
claim from the facility at which the surgery was
performed.
GEM adjudicated the claim for the anesthesiologist,
the dentist and for the tooth extraction surgery.
Ms. Atkinson's surgery was performed at a facility
within GEM's preferred provider organization,
accordingly her deductible was $1400. And, if the
policy permitted payment for the facility, GEM would
have paid $232.70,
Record @ 219-221
Meadowcroft's affidavits make no mention that:
•

She ever worked for PREMIER; or that,

•

She reviewed any Premier records, or that,

•

She has personal knowledge of the Premier file;
or that,

•

She knows Premier pre-authorized the surgery, but
refused to pre-authorize the hospital charges
because of the exclusion.

So. what Defendants have asserted that MEADOWCROFT knew and
testified-to through her affidavits is blatantly false.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs were not required to file a rebuttal
affidavit to issues not addressed by Meadowcroft's affidavits,

1&

Plaintiffs assert Premier denied Atkinson's request for benefits
because it, M i d not meet our criteria for medical necessity or
appropriateness." Record @ 6 point 12, 146, 191 @ point 4,
Premier denied this allegation in their Answer, Record, ©36,
point 12. See also Appendix WA" to Appellant's Opening Brief.

Defendants also allege Plaintiffs did not contest this issue at
trial and accordingly, the claim should fail.

But as shown

supra, Plaintiffs have addressed the trial court's repeated
refusal to hear any arguments except the coverage dispute
arguments. Thus, when the court foreclosed argument on this
issue, Plaintiffs should not be charged with a failure to bring
it before the trial court.
Defendants also allege plaintiffs did not raise this against them
in the summary judgment motion. This is manifest error, see the
Record at pages 146 and 191, point 4.

All these issues were before the trial court. In Judge
Wilkinson's order it says:
. , . the court, having heard oral argument by counsel
for the parties, having reviewed the various motions
and supporting memorandum and the file herein, . . .
Record, 276.
According to the Judge's order all the arguments and points and
authorities were before the court and reviewed by it before it

decided to grant the summary judgment. Thus, all such issues are
before this Tribunal.
The last objection Defendants make on this issue is that it is
not material to any of the Plaintiffs claims. Brief, 28-30.
Defendants' repeatedly have alleged, "Premier pre-authorized the
surgery but refused to pre-authorize the hospital charges based
upon an exclusion in the policy . . . " Brief, pages 3, 5 @ point
6; and 8. Plaintiffs point out that Premier advised them they
refused to authorize any part of the surgery because the
Atkinson's request, "did not meet (Premier's) criteria for
medical necessity or appropriateness." Is this material?

Plaintiffs say Premier refused their request because it wasn't
"medically necessary and appropriate".

Yet, Defendants say

Premier pre-authorized the surgery but refused to authorize the
hospital charges because of the exclusion.

In reviewing Appendix

yy

&" to Plaintiffs Opening Brief, we find Premier directly

contradicted by its' own document. Obviously, Premier is lying.
If Plaintiffs can show this lying to a jury they substantially
support their charge of Premier's misrepresentations.

Also, Plaintiffs have complained against Premier for breaches of
their duties of good faith and fair dealings owed Plaintiffs.
Beck, supra, at 801, says:

1

P

, . , the implied duty of good faith performance contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently
investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a
claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim ....
. . . and to refrain from action that will injure the
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract.

Plaintiffs have alleged Premier did not diligently investigate
the claim or fairly evaluate it. Plain-tiffs allege this because
four medical doctors (3 of which are Premier approved providers)
told Premier this surgery was necessary and appropriate. Consequently, Premier's misrepresentations will support Plaintiffs'
action for bad faith. And it would support Plaintiffs' allegations that when Premier failed to diligently investigate and
fairly evaluate their request, Premier engaged
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in actions that

injured the Atkinson's ability to obtain the benefits of their
contract". Beck @ 801.

These facts convincingly show that Premier's representations were
material to Plaintiffs' claims of bad faith and misrepresentation
Such conduct violates U.C.A. 31A-26-3Q3 (2)(a), (3)(b) and (h).

In their Brief at page 29, Defendants cited two cases: Wilder v»
Tanouve, 753 P2d. 816,821 (HA, 1991) for the proposition that: A
fact is material if,
once proved, it would have the effect of establishing or
refuting one of the essential elements of a r use of
action . . .

And, Atherton Condo Bd. V. Blume Development, 799 P2d. 250, 257,

(WA, 1990) for the premise:
A material fact i s also one upon which the outcome
of the l i t i g a t i o n depends in whole or in p a r t .

P l a i n t i f f s adopt t h i s case law.

Plainly, the reasons why Prexaier

denied the Atkinson's request for benefits i s material to t h e i r
charges of bad faith and misrepresentation.
representation can establish their bad faith.

Premier's
The charges of bad

f a i t h and misrepresentation will depend upon the reason Premier
denied the P l a i n t i f f s ' claim for benefits.

Defendants complain P l a i n t i f f s wove argument i n t o t h e i r Rule 56(e) a f f i d a v i t .
D e f e n d a n t s ' B r i e f , page 26, f t n t . 8, and page 27, f t n t . 9. P l a i n t i f f s admit
this.
I n a d d r e s s i n g t h e v e r y same i s s u e i n Broadwater v . Old Republic, s u p r a ,
a t 532, t h e c o u r t s a i d :
Defendants a s s a i l two of t h e a f f i d a v i t s s u b m i t t e d by p l a i n t i f f
b e c a u s e t h e y c o n t a i n o p i n i o n , l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s , and f a c t s n o t
s u p p o r t e d by adequate f o u n d a t i o n . Although a review of t h e
a f f i d a v i t s confirm t h i s a s s e s s m e n t , p o r t i o n s of t h e a f f i d a v i t s do
comply w i t h Rule 5 6 ( e ) . The o b j e c t i o n a b l e s t a t e m e n t s c o n s i s t of
l e g a l arguments and c o n c l u s i o n s and d i d n o t h i n g more t h a n
supplement t h e arguments made i n p l a i n t i f f ' s memorandum. We f a i l
t o s e e how t h i s prejudiced defendants.

DEFENDANTS ADMISSION THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
NOT WARRANTED TO SOME OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION.
Defendants told the trial court that, "with regard to a few of
Plaintiff's claims" further discovery might "lead to facts
supporting their claims to the extent that those claims may be
based on issues1* other than the coverage dispute.

Record, 162.

Defendants also told the court:

. . . Plaintiffs could discover additional facts
supporting their claim that Defendants intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on or made misrepresentations
to Plaintiffs" outside of denying their claim for the
hospital charges. To the extent that discovery may aid
Plaintiffs in establishing these facts, they should be
allowed to conduct such discovery. . . •
Record, 176 ftnt. 10

C O N C L U S I O N :
Long before the controversy arose between the Atkinsons and the
Defendants, an unbiased, professional evaluated the Atkinson's
request for benefits.

Dr. Crayton Walker, as a Premier approved

provider and one of Mrs. Atkinson's doctors, would seem to offer
a neutral evaluation. His evaluation would be competent in that
he is a dentist, an M.D., a surgeon and a Diplomat of the
American Board of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. Before this
dispute arose, Dr. Walker said:
I act as an insurance review expert in oral and maxillofacial surgery for Alta Health Strategies and the MRI
Institute of America. This scheduled surgery is appropriate and necessary for the care of this patient. I feel

that this hospitalization should be authorized and should
be covered under the patient's major medical insurance plan.
She is not a candidate for outpatient surgery.
Record, 259.

EXCLUSIONS MUST BE CLEAR.
In Alf v. State Farm, 850 P2d. 1272, 1275 (UT 1993) and in
Village Inn v. State Farm, 790 P2d. 581, 583; (UTApp., 1990)
quoting Wagner v, Farmers Ins. Exchange, 786 P2d, 763,764; (UT
App. 1990) our court have repeatedly held:
The insurer may exclude from coverage certain losses
by using "language which clearly and unmistakably
communicates to the insured the specific circumstances
under which the expected coverage will not be provided. "

The phrase in ''conjunction with dentistry" did not ''clearly and
unmistakably communicate" to the Atkinsons the "specific
circumstances under which the coverage they expected would not be
provided."

Nor, when the Atkinsons read the entire policy with

all the medical and dental benefits does the solitary exclusion
become plain and "clearly and unmistakably communicate" to them
exactly what is not covered.

DEFENDANTS1 INTERPRETATION
UNREASONABLY RESTRICTS COVERAGE.
Defendants want a strict, literal interpretation of the
exclusion. But:

or>

Where a strict, literal interpretation of a clause would
unreasonably restrict coverage of the insurance policy,
such an interpretation cannot be foisted onto a layman nor
can it be defended in terms of the risks which the layman
sought to insure against.
Miller v. Elite Ins. Co.,10 CA3d.739;
161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 328-329 (CA 1990)

To side with the Defendants' interpretation can cause absurd
results clearly not intended.

For instance, assume:

Mrs. Atkinson was involved in a serious motor vehicle
collision wherein her face was forcefully propelled
into the steering wheel. Six teeth were knocked out
but all six were recovered.
Rushed to hospital, the emergency room dental surgeon
used hundreds of stitches to restore the separated
teeth back into the jaw.
Comes now defendants and deny all the hospital charges
because replacing the teeth was Mental work" and hospital
charges in conjunction with dental work are excluded.

The interpretation the Defendants want to impose on the Atkinsons
tortures commonsense.

Plaintiffs wanted full coverage, so they

purchased both medical and dental coverage. The hospital charges
should have been paid because the exclusion is ambiguous, and
because the nature of the surgery took it out of dental care and
into medical care.

SURGERY WAS A MEDICALLY NECESSARY SICKNESS
PROCEDURE.
Under the terms of the policy, the need for the surgery should
properly be classified as a "medically necessary" "sickness"
benefit. ^Sickness" is defined as "an illness or disease which
first manifest itself after the effective date of coverage and
while the insurance is in force.1'

Record, 100-101 and 244.

Defendants make no contest that this surgical need first
manifested itself after the effective date of the policy.
"Medically necessary1' is defined as: Service supplies or
accommodations received for Sickness or which are:
.

•

« .

(b)

received in the most appropriate setting (here the
hospital);

(d)

appropriate for the diagnosis or treatment of a
Sickness or injury based on generally accepted medical
practice in your State; and,

(e)

would adversely affect the condition or quality of
medical care received if omitted as determined by
established medical review mechanisms.
Record, 100 & 244.

Plaintiff's four treating doctors have attested that the
hospital setting was most appropriate and that
Mrs. Atkinson was not a candidate for outpatient care.
Record, 256-259. Given that three of the four doctors are
Premier approved physicians this should qualify them as an
established medical review.

Thus, this surgery fits

perfectly under a "medically necessary sickness" benefit.

RELIEF REQUESTED*
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Tribunal to reverse the
summary judgment because it went against the weight of the
evidence, because the court committed plain error in precluding a
full hearing on all the issues and because it results in
substantial injustice to the Atkinsons.

Gene & Sharon Atkinson
**FplyBri«£
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